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ANIRBAN MUKHERJEE and VRINDA KADIYALI?
The U.S. motion picture industry has become increasingly reliant on
posttheatrical channel profits. Two often-cited drivers of these profits are
cross-channel substitution among posttheatrical channels and seasonal-
ity in consumer preferences for any movie. The authors use a differenti-
ated products version of the multiplicative competitive interaction model
to investigate these two phenomena. They estimate the model using data
from 2000 and 2001 on two posttheatrical channels in the U.S. market:
purchase and rental home viewing channels. Contrary to expectations
based on business press commentary, after controlling for seasonality
and movie attributes, the authors find low cross-channel price and avail-
ability elasticity for both channels. To measure the extent of cross-channel
cannibalization, they simulate a 28-day window of sequential release with
either purchase or rental channel going first. They find that windowing
reduces the sum of revenues across both channels, because more con-
sumers choose to not purchase or rent when faced with older movies in
their favored channel rather than to switch to the alternative channel with
newer movies.
Keywords: multiple channel demand, market share, seasonality,
entertainment industry
Modeling Multichannel Home Video Demand
in the U.S. Motion Picture Industry
The U.S. motion picture industry has become increas-
ingly reliant on posttheatrical revenues for overall
profitability of any movie; the high cost of movie pro-
duction often exceeds the total box office revenues of the
movie (Epstein 2005). However, posttheatrical movie chan-
nels pose their own set of challenges. For example, in
mid-2009, several movie studios were involved in a heated
dispute with Redbox, an in-store limited-selection DVD
rental kiosk service. Studios claimed that these low-price
and convenient rentals cannibalized purchase of DVDs
(Grover and Lowry 2009). In another example, in Jan-
uary 2010, Warner Bros. reached a deal with Netflix, a
rental-by-mail company, to postpone the availability of new
Warner movies to Netflix subscribers by four weeks after
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they are available for DVD purchase. The ostensible reason
was to reduce the cannibalization of purchase by rentals
(Stone 2010).
These recent developments in home video demand illus-
trate two important drivers of profitability. First, the extent
of substitution across home video channels (i.e., across
rental and purchase) might be large, explaining why stu-
dios may want to postpone releasing in the rental chan-
nel, with the aim to convert renters to purchasers. Second,
release timing in home video channels is crucial to prof-
itability, given seasonally varying demand and the small
window of profitability before newer releases crowd out
profits. Examples include Wal-Mart’s holiday season deci-
sion to reduce the shelf space for DVD purchase (Worden
2009) and Disney deciding to release Alice in Wonderland
sooner in the home viewing channel “to take advantage
of school breaks in May” (McClintock and Jaafar 2010).
In addition, cross-channel substitution and seasonal effects
might interact. For example, consumers might prefer pur-
chases (e.g., for gift giving during holidays) to rentals (e.g.,
less time to watch movies during family holidays) in one
season. Indeed, if seasonal demand variations are the dom-
inant force in demand, cross-channel elasticity as a func-
tion of price might be small after controlling for seasonal
variations.
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To address these issues of substitution and seasonal-
ity within and across the two main home channels of
DVD purchase and rentals, we use a differentiated products
version of a multiplicative competitive interaction (MCI)
model (Cooper and Nakanishi 1988). We build a maximum
likelihood estimator for our model and show through Monte
Carlo simulations that this estimator is more efficient than
the generalized method of moments (GMM) used in extant
market share models for differentiated goods (see Web
Appendix B [http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrdec11]).
Next, we estimate the model on the movies with the highest
DVD purchase revenue and movies with the highest rental
revenue in each week, during the years 2000–2001 in the
U.S. market. In the next section, we discuss why we restrict
the scope of our study to the largest movies in the home
video channels and sensitivity analyses for this choice set.
Methodologically, we model demand in multiple distri-
bution channels (i.e., purchase and rental channels), while
allowing consumer preferences to vary by channel and by
week. Literature in marketing on the motion picture indus-
try has primarily focused on single-channel research ques-
tions and, to a lesser extent, on modeling choice across
movies within a channel (for a summary, see Eliashberg,
Elberse, and Leenders 2006). In other contexts, multi-
channel models (e.g., those that model store and brand
choice within a store, for grocery store products) have
been situated in environments in which consumer prefer-
ences are time invariant. We address both issues in a single
model—that is, we measure substitution between products
across and within channels (substitution between movies
available in rental and purchase) in a market with time-
varying demand.1
Controlling for differences in top-selling and rental
movies and for time-varying consumer preference and
movie attributes, we find that in 2000–2001, substitution
across channels was limited. The rental channel exerted a
stronger substitution pressure on the purchase channel than
vice versa. To measure cross-channel elasticity, we simu-
late the effect of a 1% change in the sum of the attractions
of movies in a channel on the percentage change in rev-
enue in the competing channel. We find that the average
(across a year) cross-channel elasticity of DVD purchase
revenue with respect to the rental channel was .0047, and
the cross-channel elasticity of rentals with respect to DVD
purchase was .0621.
To understand the managerial implications of our find-
ings, we examine the impact of a 28-day delay (window)
in the availability of new movies in a channel. That is, how
would consumer demand for renting and buying movies
change if movies were released sequentially across pur-
chase and rental channels (with either channel going first)
rather than released simultaneously, as practiced in the
industry? Sequential channel release (hereinafter, we refer
to this as windowing, the industry terminology for the
release strategy) is a fairly common distribution strategy
1A more complete model of movie choice should include other distri-
bution channels, including movies running concurrently in the theatrical
channel. Our model is scalable to more channels of movies distribution. To
simplify the model, estimation, and our inference, we focus on two chan-
nels most likely to show intense competition and estimate the model on
data from a period when online purchase and rentals, as well as illegal dig-
ital downloads, were likely not important cross-channel demand drivers.
in media industries (e.g., audio) in which products are
released in one channel before other channels. We find
that in the movie industry and these two channels specif-
ically, windowing in either rentals or purchase leads to
lower revenues. Over the course of a year, windowing
rentals by 28 days reduces aggregate rental revenue by
US$157 million and increases DVD purchase revenue by
US$17 million. Conversely, windowing DVD purchases
increases rental revenue by US$2.6 million and decreases
DVD purchase revenue by US$17.5 million. Note that stu-
dio profits also depend on the revenue-sharing arrange-
ments, which in turn may vary by movie and channel. Thus,
despite the decrease in net revenue, if studios receive a
significantly larger fraction of profits in one channel, win-
dowing may be a profitable strategy. Alternatively, assum-
ing no major changes in elasticities since the time of
our data, the current rhetoric of cross-channel substitu-
tion might be masking channel power dynamics (e.g., by
advancing purchases over rental channels, studios obtain
better terms with DVD retailers). Our results also suggest
that consumer preferences in different channels (with dif-
ferent seasonal trends) dampen cross-channel substitution.
Finally, note that we conduct counterfactuals at the indus-
try level rather than the title level. Equivalent counterfactu-
als can be developed using the model to study the actions
of specific studios, for specific movies, in a given week
and year.
Although our analysis pertains to the U.S. motion picture
industry’s posttheatrical revenues, our research question
has application in other industries with multiple channels
and/or products with short life cycles. Examples include
television shows (television, off-network syndicates, and
home videos), music (audio and video singles in hard copy,
online, as part of an album, and in broader compilations),
and the fashion industry (with seasonally varying cycles
and diffusion from haute couture to mass-market). Whether
these cross-channel substitutions are more sensitive to price
and choice set rather than innate seasonal preferences or
product attributes in these other industries is unknown but
explorable through our model.
DATA
We use data of the top revenue movies in two home
video channels—rentals and DVD purchases—from Jan-
uary 2000 to December 2001. We use Nielsen VideoScan
data (including weekly units purchased and price) for the
top 35 selling movies. Prior research has also used this data
set to study movie DVD purchase (Elberse and Oberholzer-
Gee 2007). The data do not include Wal-Mart. In our period
of interest, Wal-Mart was a major retailer of DVDs that car-
ried a smaller inventory of movies than comparable national
retailers. Thus, our sample may understate the importance
of larger movies and overstate the importance of smaller
movies. We use the weekly national revenue by movie for
the top 35 renting movies in a week, according to Video
Store Magazine’s Rental Charts. To better understand sea-
sonality, Figure 1 plots what the fraction of any channel’s
annual revenue that comes from any particular week. That
is, the revenue from all movies present in each channel
in each week, divided by the average cumulative weekly
revenue, for the channels across the year.
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Figure 1
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We restrict the scope of our study to the top revenue
movies in both channels for three reasons. First, the pri-
mary purpose of our model is to investigate substitution,
within and across channels, and thus it is reasonable to esti-
mate the model on the largest revenue movies most likely
to have the largest substitution impact on other movies.
Sampling by rank enables us to retain the largest revenue
movies and drop movies that are less likely to exert substi-
tution pressures. Second, although our model is a reason-
able description (required to develop a market share model
admitting heterogeneity) of consumers choosing between
the largest revenue movies in a week, choice sets that
include smaller movies would likely require additional con-
siderations. For example, theatrical revenue is likely to be a
poorer predictor of home video revenue for smaller movies
targeted at niche audiences. Third, nonlinear market share
models are computationally expensive. Similar to extant
literature, we face a trade-off between the generalizabil-
ity of the model using a larger data sample and simula-
tion or computational error, which limits us in the size of
the choice set that we can use in estimation (for a discus-
sion of the implementation of the estimation algorithm, see
Appendix A [http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrdec11]).
To test the robustness of our model and findings to
this assumption, we reestimated our model with the top
25 movies in each channel, rather than the choice set of
35 movies per channel. We also reestimated it using a larger
set of movies in the purchase channel (top 100 movies)
than in the rental channel (top 25 movies) to ensure that our
findings are not being driven by the sampling methodology.
The market share for a movie in the rental channel becomes
quite small as we go down the list of rental ranking and
diminishes faster than shares in the purchase channel for
equivalent rankings. The top-renting movie had greater than
20% within-channel market share (share of revenue of the
channel), while the top-selling movie had 14% within-
channel market share (on average across all weeks in our
data). The 25th largest movie by rental revenue had a mean
within-channel market share of .5%, versus 1.1% for the
25th largest movie by purchases. By adding more movies
to the purchase channel, we offset the effect of the long tail.
Our substantive findings remained the same in both cases.
We assume that the total market for posttheatrical pur-
chases and rentals is 208 million consumers, correspond-
ing to the population of the United States between 15 and
75 years of age in 2000. To accommodate the possibil-
ity of both buying and renting DVDs in any single week,
we allow for two decision occasions for each consumer on
average, leading to 416 million total decision occasions. In
each decision occasion, a consumer can purchase or rent a
movie or choose the outside alternative.
Pricing policies differ across the purchase and rental
channels. In the rental channel, prices are almost always
uniform (Orbach and Einav 2007) and revenue shared
between the rental store and the studio. We assume a mean
rental price of $2.50 per movie for the duration of the
study (Hettrick 2000) and find that our results are robust
to a range of price means. In DVD purchases, we use the
weekly price of each movie averaged across all discount
mass stores, drugstores, and grocery stores in the United
States (which account for approximately 43% of all units
sold in the data set). As Table 1 shows, substantial varia-
tion exists in DVD purchase prices across movies (across
both weeks and movies in any week).
To enrich the forecasting model, we gather data on
additional variables. Box Office is the box office revenue
of a movie before its released in the home video chan-
nel. Budget is the cost of making the film. We obtain
data on print and advertising expenditure (P&A) for each
movie at the box office stage from Paul Kagan Asso-
ciates. We use the percentage of positive critics’ reviews
for a movie, the Tomatometer, available at Rotten Tomatoes
(http://www.rottentomatoes.com), as a summary measure of
critics’ ratings. We also have data on when a movie was
released in theaters and in home video channels.
MODELING ISSUES AND APPROACH
Models of Multichannel Consumer Demand
We begin by providing an overview of multichannel
models of movie demand in empirical literature, focus-
ing on possible differences in our study. Luan and Sudhir
(2007) model the impact of cannibalization of purchase and
rentals of movies on box office revenues for any single
movie, accounting for consumers’ forward-looking behav-
ior at the theater. We take theatrical performance as a given
and instead focus on possible competition between rentals
and DVD purchases. Our motivation and substantive find-
ings therefore are complementary to Luan and Sudhir.
Hennig-Thurau et al. (2007) use conjoint methods to
examine how consumers may substitute between channel
assortments, considered by the industry but not yet found
in the market (e.g., the simultaneous release of a movie in
theatrical and home video channels). Knox and Eliashberg
(2009) model the rent or buy decision at a “rentailer”
(a rental store that also sells movies). They focus on identi-
fying different consumer segments, based on the propensity
to buy and rent movies, and develop pricing strategies for
the rentailer tailored for each segment. Our model comple-
ments both studies by examining rental and purchase deci-
sions across all retail and rental stores in the United States
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Table 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Box Office P&A Budget Weeks Since Weeks Since
(in Millions (in Millions (in Millions Critics’ Theatrical Home Video
Price of Dollars) of Dollars) of Dollars) Rating Release Release
DVD Purchase
Minimum 5002 1000 020 275 3000 14057 1000
Median 19097 66000 30000 42000 63000 68057 28000
Mean 20026 89006 28081 49035 59099 136082 49078
Maximum 35000 601000 66000 218025 100000 589000 242000
SD 3036 76016 13032 34064 26013 37052 10002
Rental
Minimum N.A. 1000 600 750 3000 14029 1000
Median N.A. 34000 25,000 33,600 47000 28029 5000
Mean N.A. 54052 25,618 41,465 47082 28093 4097
Maximum N.A. 431000 63,600 182,500 100000 63057 13000
SD N.A. 55027 14011 32011 27003 5088 3049
Note: N0A0 = not applicable.
and investigating strategic decisions of a studio optimizing
across channels at the national level.
Finally, Chiou (2008) measures two drivers of mar-
ket expansion (and contraction) in the home video mar-
ket: intertemporal differences in consumer preferences and
intertemporal differences in the quality of new releases.
Similar to single-channel models, as in Einav (2007),
Chiou uses a homogeneous market share model to allow
the transformation of the shares to a quasilinear function
of the movie observables. Our model extends this model
by including full heterogeneity across coefficients, which
reduces restrictions on the substitution patterns across prod-
ucts and channels and enables us to investigate time-
varying and cross-channel substitution effects.
Market Attraction
We begin with a description of the MCI model (Cooper
and Nakanishi 1988). In MCI, the market share of a product
is a function of the ratio of the mean market attraction of
the product to the sum of the mean market attractions of
all products. For our application, let amcwy be the attraction
of movie m in channel c, week w, and year y, and let Ccwy
be the choice set of movies in channel c, week w, and
year y (we include the last to account for market growth in
the two-year period of the our data). The market share of
movie m (denoted msmcwy) is as follows:
msmcwy =
exp6log4amcwy57∑
k ∈Ccwy exp6log4akcwy57
0
Our model adds three components to MCI. First, the
model allows for different substitution structures within
and across different channels. For example, a movie may
have greater share in rentals than purchase, implying a
different within-channel cross-elasticity (substitution pres-
sure on other movies) in rentals than in purchase. Second,
the model allows the attraction to change with seasonal-
ity (specifically by week). Third, we include heterogeneity
in the attraction function. We discuss each of these subse-
quently, followed by a discussion of the operationalization
of the attraction function.
Multiple Channels
Taking the MCI model and drawing from the nested
logit model, we write a consumer i’s in-channel probability
of choosing movie m in channel c, week w, and year y
(denoted msimcwy  icwy) as follows:
msimcwy  icwy =
exp6log4aimcwy5/Ðc7∑
k ∈Ccwy exp6log4aikcwy57/Ðc
=
exp6log4aimcwy5/Ðc7
Dicwy
0
Similar to nested logit models, we constrain Ðc (here-
inafter called “channel nesting parameters”) to be strictly
between 0 and 1. The channel nesting parameters con-
trol market expansion and cross-channel substitution. The
release of a new movie in channel c increases Dicwy, with
Ðc determining the new total channel revenue after mar-
ket expansion. A larger channel parameter implies that the
cumulative channel market share is more sensitive to the
cumulative market attraction of the channel: A new movie
leads share to be stolen from other channels (cross-channel
substitution) and from the outside good (market expan-
sion). Cross-channel substitution occurs because the same
movie is often present in both channels (though a top-
renting movie might not be in the top-selling movie list,
and vice versa), and a focal movie in a channel may sub-
stitute across channels to other movies and/or cannibalize
its own revenues in other channels. To set scale, we set the
mean attraction of the outside good and, thus, Di0wy to 1.
The outside good refers to any customer neither buying nor
renting in a week (recall our previous discussion of market
size). We model the probability of purchasing or renting a
movie in channel c (mscwy) as follows:
msicwy = 4Dicwy5Ðc
/[
1+
∑
k ∈ channels
4Dikwy5
Ðk
]
0
A limitation of our model is that because of the sig-
nificant challenge of gathering representative disaggregate
data, we assume that consumers choose to purchase and/or
rent a movie (or choose the outside option) in every deci-
sion occasion in a week and that choices across decision
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occasions are made independently. Estimating a model that
separates state dependence (modeling the statistical rela-
tionship between the multiple decision occasions in each
week across multiple purchases/rentals by each consumer)
from unobserved heterogeneity (unobserved differences in
preferences across consumers) would require individual-
level (disaggregate) data representative of the national U.S.
market (for a recent application, see Dubé, Hitsch, and
Rossi 2010). To the best of our knowledge, such data
are not available commercially for the home video mar-
ket. Therefore, our study complements research conducted
on the movie industry (e.g., Knox and Eliashberg 2009)
that uses disaggregate data to identify drivers of individ-
ual behavior, but the findings are necessarily limited to
consumers of a store or group of stores and to a specific
geographical area. In contrast, our data represent aggregate
trends across the national market, allowing for substantive
findings that measure the effectiveness of national market-
ing strategy decisions of the studios.
Modeling Seasonality
Consider a movie released in home video at the begin-
ning of November. In the third week of November, dur-
ing the peak holiday shopping season, the movie will be
well positioned to take advantage of consumers buying gifts
for their family and friends. That is, with its release in
the midst of the holiday shopping season, purchases of the
movie will be higher than in a lean season. However, in the
same season, the movie may not do well in rentals, because
viewers are busy with other pursuits (shopping or spending
time with family).
As this example suggests, our model must capture
changes in purchases/rentals due to seasonal changes in
consumer preferences (e.g., an increase in preference for
purchases in the holiday season). In addition, accounting
for the seasonal consumer preferences, studios will likely
release their best movies in November (though modeling
studios’ decisions is outside the scope of this article, and
we take their decisions as exogenous in the model). There-
fore, the model must also capture market expansion due
to changes in the number and quality of choice sets over
seasons (e.g., more and higher-quality DVDs released in
the holiday season, increasing the overall demand for DVD
purchases for gifting).
We add channel-specific week fixed effects to the mar-
ket attractions of movies to capture seasonally changing
consumer preferences (for a homogeneous version of this
model, see Einav 2007). The seasonal fixed effect accounts
for changes in the attraction of purchase and rental options
across seasons compared with the outside good: how much
more or less the purchase or rental of any movie is attrac-
tive to a consumer in each week. Note that we allow sea-
sonal changes in preferences across the two channels to be
systematically correlated with each other (e.g., we allow
the demand for rentals to decrease and demand for pur-
chases to increase in a week because consumers are busy
shopping for gifts and therefore have less time to watch
rental DVDs). These fixed effects can be inconsequentially
small or even zero. That is, we allow, but do not require,
consumer preferences to be seasonal. A positive weekly
coefficient for a channel increases the total number of pur-
chases for the channel in a week because it increases the
mean attractiveness of movies in the channel, winning cus-
tomers from other channels (interchannel substitution) and
the outside option (market expansion). A negative coeffi-
cient has the opposite effect. We capture market expansion
due to changing choice sets by Dicwy increasing with better
and more movies released in a week. Formally, we define
the mean market attraction amcwy to a consumer i for movie
m in channel c, week w, and year y as follows:
log4aimcy5 = log4Äimcwy5− Òcw − Òcy + Îmcwy0(1)
In Equation 1, the components of attraction are as fol-
lows: The deterministic component Äimcwy is a function
of observed variables, such as movie genre, theatrical
advertising, and so on. Subsequently, we discuss our spec-
ification of this function and provide a description of its
components. The term Òcw is a channel-specific weekly
unobservable shock, estimated as a channel–week fixed
effect, common to all choices in a given channel and week,
and is allowed to be different across rentals and purchase
and to vary freely across the year. To model overall changes
in consumer preferences, we also include a channel-specific
time trend Òcy in each channel. We model unobserved prod-
uct attributes as product-specific shocks. These include
movie plot and the psychological and informational setting
of a consumer (Neelamegham and Jain 1999; Sawhney and
Eliashberg 1996).
In the single-channel model, the channel coefficient is
(implicitly) set at 1, yielding the multinomial logit specifi-
cation on choice probabilities. Prior research that has built a
likelihood estimator for single-channel models (e.g., Jiang,
Manchanda, and Rossi 2009; Park and Gupta 2009) has
assumed a parametric distribution on Îmcwy. Unlike the logit
model, in the nested logit model, the scaled shock Îmcwy/Ðc
shifts within-channel probabilities. The model allows the
cross-channel coefficient to have values between 0 and
1 and is underidentified if we specify only a distribu-
tion on Îmcwy. We build on the single-channel models and
use the natural corollary of their parameterization: We
parameterize the distribution of Îmcwy/Ðc to be a draw
from a multivariate normal distribution and recover Ðc
nonparametrically.2 Conditional on the channel coefficient,
the within-channel probability model is equivalent to the
single-channel models discussed previously. In our model,
a change in within-channel probabilities (equivalent to the
single-channel model) identifies all coefficients, except the
channel coefficient. Identification of the channel coefficient
comes from the change in the probability of purchasing
versus renting versus the outside good (i.e., the choice of
channel identifies the channel coefficient).
Modeling Heterogeneity
Movies are highly differentiated products, and it is nearly
impossible to gather enough data (e.g., on movie plots)
to explain all the determinants of revenue success. There-
fore, we use a random coefficient nested logit share model
that allows for movie-specific unobservables. In line with
Nevo’s (2000) terminology, the model has the following
2Park and Gupta (2009) find that a model defined using the multivari-
ate normal specification is reasonably robust to different data-generating
processes.
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sets of coefficients: Linear coefficients refer to components
of the mean attraction of a movie. Channel coefficients are
the channel nesting parameters discussed previously. Non-
linear coefficients are the components of the individual-
specific (heterogeneous) attraction of a movie discussed
subsequently.
To model consumer heterogeneity, similar to Lee,
Boatwright, and Kamakura’s (2003) specification, we
model the covariance matrix of the unobservables (vi ∈æ)
as a multivariate normal distribution. This formulation
allows for covariance in the taste for different product
attributes. Therefore, market shares are as follows (for fur-
ther discussion of our maximum likelihood estimator of this
market share model, see the “Model Estimation” section):
msmcwy =
∫
vi ∈æ
msimcwy  icwymsicwy dvi =
∫
vi ∈æ
msimcwy dvi0
Operationalizing the Attraction Function
In our attraction function, we use many of the commonly
used product descriptors for movies (e.g., genre, produc-
tion budget) in a straightforward manner, and so we do not
discuss them further. In addition, we control for “perisha-
bility,” or the age of movies in the home video channel,
by making the attraction function a function of time since
theatrical release and the time in the home video channel.
In the theatrical channel, Sawhney and Eliashberg (1996)
propose a three-parameter gamma model (BOXMOD) for
predicting box office revenue. After a meta-analysis of ear-
lier movies, they predict first week, peak, and decay of the-
atrical revenue over weeks. Einav’s (2007) model assumes
a steady exponential decay in attractions in the weeks fol-
lowing release. Ainslie, Drèze, and Zufryden (2005) dis-
tinguish between a blockbuster decline (early peak) and a
sleeper decline (later peak).
To capture similar patterns, we follow Sawhney and
Eliashberg’s (1996) suggestion and use a bivariate gen-
eralized gamma formulation (this formulation is known
as the generalized Leontief function in production eco-
nomics literature) on two dimensions: time since theatrical
release and time since home video release. The bivariate
generalized gamma distribution allows the interaction of
the dimensions (random variables) in the shape parameter
to capture the aforementioned interaction effect. Suppress-
ing subscripts denoting movie m, channel c, week w, and
year y, we write the deterministic component as follows:
log4Äi5 = Âip log4p5+ÂiBO log4BO5+ÂiP&A log4P&A5+Âx log4x5
+Â14WB5+Â24WHV5+Â34WB54WHV5+Â4 log4WB5
+Â5 log4WHV51
where p is the price, BO is box office revenue, P&A is
print and advertising expenditure in the primary channel,
WT is weeks since theatrical release, and WHV is weeks
since release on home video. The term WB = WT−WHV
is the time between theatrical and home channels, or the
number of weeks between the two releases. Furthermore,
x includes all movie-specific observables (e.g., genre) to
capture the mean attraction of the movie. Box office rev-
enue captures the impact of unobservables and is a proxy
for movie quality (Krider and Weinberg 1998; Lehmann
and Weinberg 2000). As explained previously, we assume
that the price of a rental remains constant over the length
of the data set, and we use the observed mean transaction
price in DVD purchases.
We abstract from questions related to the retailer and
rental store marketing-mix variables (including stock and
breath of products carried) and assume that movies on
home video have uniform distribution intensity. As we are
studying the highest-selling and highest-renting movies,
including sales from online distribution channels, product
unavailability is of lesser concern in our application. Fur-
thermore, unlike theatrical releases, home video releases
are always simultaneous across all regions of the United
States; there is no equivalent on home video, in wide
release or limited release (differences in distribution inten-
sity by geography), of a movie.
MODEL ESTIMATION
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
We first provide a brief overview of the estimation algo-
rithm and then discuss the statistical properties of our
estimator and alternative estimators. The estimator is as
follows:
argmax
È
Pr4P ℵ3È5 = argmax
È
∏
8w1y9
(∫
s4M5
ÌÎ
{
Î6swy4M57
}
ds4M5
)
wy
= argmax
È
∏
8w1y9
ÌÎ
{
Î6swy4M57
}
+Op
(√
M
)
1
where P is the purchase vector, ℵ is the set of indepen-
dent variables (e.g., box office gross), Î¬ 8Îmcwy/Ðc9 is the
vector of mean attraction shocks, Îˆ is the vector of recov-
ered shocks, ÌÎ is the conditional distribution on the mean
attraction shocks, and swy is the share vector in week w
and year y. For a set of nonlinear parameters, we construct
the likelihood in three steps:
Step 1: Recover fixed points: We use the contraction mapping
that Berry and Jia (2010) suggest to solve the model
for a¯mcwy/Ðc, the recovered mean attractions of each
movie. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes’s (1995) Theo-
rem 1, restated in our context, shows that a set of
shares in an infinitely large market (infinite consumers)
corresponds to a unique vector of mean attractions per
movie in a channel, a week, and a year. The contrac-
tion map solves for the unique vector of attractions
corresponding to the vector of nonlinear coefficients.
4a¯mcwy/Ðc5j+1 = 4a¯mcwy/Ðc5j ×
sˆmcwy
smcwy4a¯1 Ð5
0
Step 2: Recover mean attraction shocks: We project
log4a¯mcwy/Ðc5, recovered in Step 1, on the design
matrix (observables) corresponding to the linear model
for mean attraction to recover Îˆ.3
3To correct for endogenous variables, we can replace the design matrix
with an instrumented design matrix (e.g., a design matrix formed by pro-
jecting endogenous variables on the instruments). Alternatively, we can
add a function of the residuals from the linear projection of the endoge-
nous variables on instruments to the projection equation (see Petrin and
Train 2010). Substituting the recovered coefficients in the original normal
equation leads to consistent estimates of the mean attraction shocks.
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Step 3: Construct likelihood: We construct the log-likelihood
from the recovered mean attraction shocks.
log6Pr4P  ℵ3 È57 = ∑
8w1y9
log
(
ÌÎ
{
Îˆ6sˆwy4M57
})
0
Web Appendix A (see http://www.marketingpower.com/
jmrdec11] provides details on the estimation and
computation of the likelihood. Web Appendix B pro-
vides simulations that describe the properties of our
estimator.
Efficiency and Consistency of Estimators
We use the conditional probability of the mean error
(Îmcwy/Ðc) to build a maximum likelihood estimator for
our model. Our approach has two advantages over build-
ing the likelihood as in the work of Park and Gupta (2009)
and Jiang, Manchanda, and Rossi (2009). First, the like-
lihood of purchases defined in their models tends toward
zero at an exponential rate with a large number of brands
and/or purchases. We estimate our model on 70 products
in each period, which is considerably larger than the num-
ber of purchase choices considered in either of the other
likelihood-based approaches. For a small number of brands,
we can randomly sample the purchase vector to estimate
the model. However, the random sample needs to be large
when some brands have low market share. In contrast,
the mapping, given previously, is stable when recovering
mean attractions of small market share brands. Second, we
assume sampling without replacement, which is the likely
sampling mechanism in a market in which all the poten-
tial consumers are represented in the aggregated data. The
generalization is important when recovering heterogeneity
parameters.
Another alternative to our estimator is the GMM esti-
mator proposed by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
We show through Monte Carlo simulations (see Web
Appendix B [http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrdec11])
that the estimator in our model is significantly more effi-
cient than the GMM estimator. In addition, in our research
setting, good candidates for the instruments required by the
GMM estimator are not available (for a discussion on com-
monly chosen instruments, see Nevo 2000). For example,
unlike in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes’s original applica-
tion to the automobile market, in the home entertainment
industry, the marginal costs of manufacturing DVDs are not
significant cost shifters, and thus they cannot be used as
cost-side instruments. Our described likelihood estimator
does not require similar instruments to build an objective
function, making it a natural fit for our research question.
A limitation of our estimation strategy is that we ignore
sampling error and thus require a large “aggregation pop-
ulation”: the number of potential customers who made a
purchase (or no purchase) decision in each week. In our
application, similar to extant applications of the framework
to nationally aggregated market share data, we estimate the
model on data aggregated over purchases and rentals across
the United States. Park and Gupta’s (2009) approach allows
for sampling error because it was developed for the con-
verse situation—in which aggregate shares are observed in
a grocery store. Our approach is appropriate only when
considering large market sizes and, thus, in situations in
which the sampling error is minimal enough to be assumed
away in the optimization. We suggest that researchers
interested in using either likelihood method for estimating
market share models should choose the appropriate estima-
tion strategy based on the size of the underlying “aggrega-
tion population” and the number of brands/products con-
sidered in the problem.
RESULTS
Drivers of Movie Market Share
As in Lehmann and Weinberg (2000), we find that larger
box office revenue predicts larger home video channel
attractiveness. Similar to prior findings, we find that a
greater number of weeks since theatrical release decrease
the attractiveness of the movie for purchase. However,
posttheatrical perishability does not affect the attractive-
ness of rentals. Both channels show nonlinear patterns in
attractiveness with time since release on home video and
time since release in the theatrical channel. The interaction
between weeks between theater and home video and weeks
since release on home video is not significant in both pur-
chase and rentals. Table 2 reports the estimates of the linear
coefficients.
We find that theatrical P&A has a negative coefficient
for the mean attractiveness in purchase, suggesting nega-
tive spillovers across channels. A possible reason for this is
as follows: A movie with high levels of advertising might
generate high theatrical revenues, but if it fails to live up to
its hype, there might be negative word of mouth from the-
atrical viewers that drives down the subsequent demand in
DVD purchase. To quantify the negative impact of excess
theatrical P&A, consider the movie The Thomas Crown
Affair, with descriptive characteristics very similar to the
Table 2
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS OF MEAN ATTRACTION IN HOME
VIDEO CHANNELS
Purchase Rentals
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
(Intercept) −60927∗∗∗ 0249 −80132∗∗∗ 0436
Log(theatrical revenues) 60251∗∗∗ 0173 40360∗∗∗ 0104
Log(P&A) −30660∗∗∗ 0251 −0040 0160
Log(production budget) −0039∗∗ 0018 0079∗∗∗ 0012
Log(critics’ ratings) 0189∗∗∗ 0018 −00002 0011
Weeks in home video
channel (WHV) 0012∗∗∗ 00006 −0319∗∗∗ 0010
Weeks between theater and
home channel (WB) −00008∗∗ 00004 −0023∗∗∗ 0007
WHV×WB 000001 000002 00007∗ 00003
Log(WHV) −0906∗∗∗ 0013 0416∗∗∗ 0029
Log(WB) 0028 0036 0317∗ 0178
PG-rating dummy −0472∗∗∗ 0054 −0147∗∗ 0038
PG13-rating dummy −0504∗∗∗ 0048 0006 0036
R-rating dummy −0018∗∗∗ 0048 0065∗ 0035
Comedy dummy −0199∗∗∗ 0029 0035 0024
Family dummy −0556∗∗∗ 0054 −0593∗∗∗ 0043
Foreign movies dummy −0272∗∗∗ 0103 −0232∗∗ 0080
Horror dummy −0033∗∗∗ 0047 0063∗ 0037
Mystery suspense dummy −0237∗∗∗ 0039 0040 0030
Science fiction dummy 0244∗∗∗ 0037 −0011 0045
Western dummy −0468 0303 −0680∗∗∗ 0021
∗p < 01.
∗∗p < 005.
∗∗∗p < 001.
Notes: N.A. = not applicable.
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mean/median descriptive characteristic of all movies in our
data set, as Table 1 describes. The movie made a cumu-
lative $69 million in its theatrical release. It cost $50 mil-
lion to make, with a further $28 million spent on theatrical
P&A. It had a Rotten Tomatoes (critics’) rating of 69 out
of 100 and was released in the first week of January 2000,
21 weeks after its theatrical release date. Our estimates
imply that, all else being equal, a further $25 million spent
promoting the movie in the theatrical channels, without a
change in box office revenue, would reduce DVD purchase
revenue by 6%.
We estimate coefficients of the variance matrix by boot-
strapping from the upper Cholesky matrix. Table 3 reports
the mean and the lower and upper bound at the 95% con-
fidence interval for all coefficients. The significance codes
correspond to a null hypothesis of the covariance matrix
coefficient being equal to 0. We find that consumers who
are more sensitive to theatrical revenues and/or more sen-
sitive to theatrical promotions and advertising expenditure
have a lower price response coefficient for DVD purchase
(covariance coefficients for price and theatrical revenue and
for price and theatrical P&A are both negative). The impli-
cation is that consumers who are more receptive to higher
theatrical revenue and theatrical P&A are less price sensi-
tive than the average consumer.
Substitution Between DVD Purchase and Rentals
As we noted previously, studios claim that the major
driver for changing release timings across channels is that
cheap rentals are cannibalizing the more profitable DVD
purchases. Similar to a measure of elasticity with respect to
price, we require a measure of cross-channel elasticity with
respect to the mean quality of movies released in a channel.
The measure corresponds to this thought experiment: If we
lower/raise the mean quality of movies in a channel, how
Table 3
ESTIMATED NONLINEAR (HETEROGENEITY) AND
CHANNEL COEFFICIENTS
Channel Variable Coefficienta SE
Purchase Variance (price) 0206∗ 000198
Variance (log[theatrical
revenue]) 0149∗ 000693
Variance (log[P&A]) 3013∗ 00238
Covariance (price, log[theatrical
revenue]) −00130∗ 000365
Covariance (log[theatrical revenue],
log[P&A]) 00645∗ 000333
Covariance (price, log[P&A]) −0624∗ 00166
Rentals Variance (log[theatrical revenue]) 1050∗ 00351
Variance (log[P&A]) 0934∗ 00258
Covariance (log[theatrical revenue],
log[P&A]) −1016∗ 00288
Purchase Channel nesting coefficient 0999 00183
Rentals Channel nesting coefficient 0880 0294
∗p < 001.
aSignificance codes are for t-tests that compare coefficient estimated
with a null hypothesis of the coefficient being 0. There is no null hypothe-
sis for the channel coefficient. The distribution of the bootstrapped channel
coefficients is truncated at 0 and 1.
many consumers would substitute across channels? Higher
cross-channel elasticity indicates stronger consumer substi-
tution, while lower cross-channel elasticity indicates lower
consumer substitution.
We find that in 2000–2001, controlling for differences
in movies available for rental or purchase, consumers were
less likely to substitute from the rental channel to the pur-
chase channel than from the purchase channel to the rental
channel. We find that the average (across a year) cross-
channel elasticity of DVD purchase revenue is .0047 while
the cross-channel elasticity of rentals is .0621. It is impor-
tant to note here that this result of small cross-channel
elasticity is significantly based on controlling for seasonal
preferences and movie characteristics. That is, these con-
trols influence consumer choice of whether to rent or pur-
chase (or do neither) more than the simple cross-channel
substitution based on movie quality in the other channel.
To understand the managerial implications of our find-
ings, we simulate a 28-day delay (window) in the avail-
ability of new movies in a channel relative to release in
the competing channel. Our simulation corresponds to our
previous example of movie studios imposing a 28-day win-
dow for new releases, in which movies are not available for
rentals on Netflix but are available for purchase on DVD.4
Thus, in the simulation, we preserve the selection (number
and identity) of movies available in the first channel and
delay the launch in the second channel, altering the choice
set of movies available to consumers. We find that win-
dowing reduces overall revenues. Postponing rentals (chan-
nel exclusivity for DVD purchases) increases revenue from
purchases by US$17 million over a year and decreases
rental revenue by US$157 million in the same year (see
Figure 2, Panel A). Postponing DVD purchases (channel
exclusivity for rentals) decreases revenue from purchases
by US$17.5 million over a year and increases rental rev-
enue by US$2.6 million in the same year (see Figure 2,
Panel B). In other words, when faced with older movies in
their preferred channel versus newer movies in their non-
preferred channel, consumers opt to not purchase rather
than to switch to the nonpreferred channel.
As mentioned previously, studios make more profits in
the purchase channel than in the rental channel. If the stu-
dio margin from DVD purchase is significantly larger than
the margin from rental, studios may be able to increase
their profits by postponing release in the rental channel
despite a decline in overall revenue. This is especially likely
if studios can get better terms from DVD retailers when
they offer purchase exclusivity by postponing rentals (i.e.,
if their channel power increases with the change in distribu-
tion policy). For example, as mentioned previously, studios
moved to postpone rentals on Netflix. The entry of Redbox
led to significantly lower rental margins, making a case
4We are assuming that all studios pick this window for all movies. A
complete model of competitive studio behavior should include endoge-
nously determined optimal windowing (which might vary by studio,
movie, and channel) and its impact on changed DVD titles available for
purchase and rental. Such a model is outside the scope of this article.
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Figure 2
28-DAY CHANNEL EXCLUSIVITY
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for advancing the more profitable DVD purchase channel
release date despite potentially lower overall revenues.
We also measure substitution patterns as a function of
DVD purchase prices (approximating the cross-channel
price elasticity). Consider again the movie The Thomas
Crown Affair described previously, which is similar to the
mean/median title in our data set. We simulate the effect of
increasing the DVD purchase price by $1 (corresponding
to a 5% price increase; the original price of the DVD was
$20). We find a large within-channel substitution effect,
with 80% of consumers substituting the purchase of that
DVD for the next best-selling DVD. Less than 1% of
those substituting the DVD chose a rental movie, echoing
previous findings of low cross-channel elasticities across
both channels.
Seasonality of Demand
There are three time-varying demand drivers in our
model: seasonal change in consumer preferences, possible
market expansion due to the release of more and better
movies in a period, and the substitution effects of movies
within and across channels. Although our model is general
enough to conduct simulations to analyze the managerial
implications of changes in any of these factors, in this sec-
tion we discuss the recovered seasonality of demand and
conduct a counterfactual that measures aggregate demand
if consumer preferences are not seasonal.
Figure 3, Panel A, plots the recovered seasonality in con-
sumer preferences. The results indicate that DVD purchase
is more seasonal than renting. To understand the role of sea-
sonality in shaping observed demand, in Figure 3, Panel B,
we analyze the effect of seasonal changes on the revenue
of movies in a channel. We simulate channel revenue in a
nonseasonal market (assuming the average seasonal effect
across all weeks) without changing the substitution set in
any week. If the observed increases in total channel rev-
enue (DVD purchase or rentals) were solely due to market
expansion, the simulated revenue (without seasonal changes
in consumer preferences) should be equal to the observed
revenue. The simulation (Figure 3, Panel B) shows that sea-
sonal changes in preferences are a strong driver of DVD
purchase but do not affect DVD rentals as significantly.
In particular, cumulative DVD purchases drop to approx-
imately 25% of the observed (seasonal) sales in the peak
weeks of demand (around Thanksgiving) in our simulation,
if preferences were deseasonalized as described previously.
Our estimates of the random coefficients nested channel–
movie selection model enable us to conduct simulations to
answer managerial questions pertaining to the impact of
DVD purchases on rentals (and vice versa), the impact of
pricing on channel revenues, and the influence of seasonal
effects on demand. Additional counterfactuals that can be
conducted using our model include measuring demand by
movie, channel, and week with either a change in con-
sumer preferences or a change in release date and/or price
of the movie.
CONCLUSION
We describe and estimate a model of weekly DVD pur-
chase and rental revenue by movie. Our model incorpo-
rates both seasonal demand variation and the market effects
of better movies being released in periods of peak sales.
Among our main findings are the following: First, there is
limited cross-channel substitution pressure, with an asym-
metry in substitution between DVD purchase and rentals.
Consumers were less likely to substitute from the rental
channel to the purchase channel than from the purchase
channel to the rental channel. Second, consumers who are
more receptive to higher theatrical revenue and theatrical
P&A are less price sensitive than the average consumer.
Our model has several drawbacks. First, we do not
include other sources of entertainment, such as television,
that might have systematic time variance and compete with
movies on home video. Not including competitive sources
of entertainment may misstate the estimated substitution
effects. Second, we estimate our model on data from the
994 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, DECEMBER 2011
Figure 3
IMPACT OF THE SEASONALITY OF CONSUMER
PREFERENCES ON CUMULATIVE CHANNEL REVENUE
A: Seasonal Change in Consumer Preferences
B: Deseasonalized Cumulative Channel Revenue
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two primary channels of home video demand in our period
of interest. A study of home video channels using more
recent data would not change the modeling problem but
would require data on additional channels than rentals and
purchases. Thus, our estimates of cross-channel substitu-
tion should be interpreted with caution in the current home
video landscape.
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